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Best paradoxical cases 
It is of the nature of the two-envelope paradox when fully developed that not 
only are there several plausible ways of evaluating swapping, but that there are 
intricate semi-dependencies between those ways. Consequently a certain 
amount of complexity has to be marshalled in order to be sure of both 
covering the full extent of the problem and eliminating those parts which are 
inessential or not paradoxical. 
Finite two-envelope cases are ones in which there is an upper bound on the 
amount of money in an envelope. Everybody agrees that the finite cases are 
solved by the considerations we give in section 1 of our paper.   
The expectations in infinite two-envelope cases are identical to infinite 
sums, which mathematicians call ‘series’. So, to speak of an expectation, such 
as E(B – A), in these cases, is to speak of a series. Series are identified by the 
infinite sequence of their terms; rearranging the terms of a series gives you a 
different series. The sum of a series is defined to be the limit of the sequence 
of its partial sums. So when we speak of the behaviour of expectations in the 
infinite cases we are speaking of the behaviour of series, which is defined in 
terms of the behaviour of sequences. These are among the fruits of the 
nineteenth century demand for rigour in that part of mathematics called 
‘analysis’. 
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In our Appendix (pp. 430 ff.
1
) we make use of those fruits in analysing the 
infinite two-envelope cases. We consider ‘five different series which may be 
held to give the average expected gain on swapping’ (p. 430). On the basis of 
showing how they depend on the behaviour of a certain family of sequences, 
2npn,
2
 and on the senses in which a series can be said to be well defined, we 
categorize the kinds of infinite cases. We show which kinds of infinite case are 
not paradoxical (p. 435, remarks 1 and 2), and the conditions under which 
certain ways of evaluating swapping can be ignored because they fail to give 
even a semblance of an answer (p. 435, remarks (a), (b) and 3). We identify 
the two kinds of paradoxical cases, only one of which had been previously 
identified and discussed as such in the literature (p. 435, remarks 4 and 5).  
The kind previously identified were cases in which the average expected 
gain on swapping, calculated as E(E(B|A) – A), is infinite. We named such 
cases ‘unbounded paradoxical’ and pointed out that divergence to infinity is 
only controversially a way for an infinite sum to be well defined. Some earlier 
discussions claimed that the paradox was solved by rejecting divergent 
expectations. That is to say, the paradox as stated initially gets you to calculate 
an expectation based on a supposition of what is in your envelope, E(B|A) – A, 
which when you find it to be positive persuades you to swap. But, say those 
who reject divergent expectations, a condition on the propriety of that 
 
1
 Page references are to Clark and Shackel 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
2
 Mathematicians tend to use curly brackets both for sets and for naming sequences: 
here it would be ‘{2npn}’. Since angle brackets are standardly understood by 
philosophers to apply to ordered sets, we have specified sequences and families of 
sequences by their use.  
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procedure is that the average such expected gain, E(E(B|A) – A), must be well 
defined, and since divergence is not a way to be well defined, and E(E(B|A) – 
A) diverges to infinity, the paradox is solved. 
The second kind of paradoxical case, which we called ‘best paradoxical’, 
are ones in which the average expected gain on swapping, calculated as 
E(E(B|A) – A), is finite. Such cases cannot be solved by the rejection of 
divergence. Since we exhibited such a case, the question of whether 
divergence is improper is moot so far as solving the two-envelope paradox in 
general goes. We shall therefore assume that Measham and Weisberg are 
concerned only with best paradoxical cases. 
Decision theory 
We are puzzled by many things Measham and Weisberg say about decision 
theory.  
They seem to be confused about the existence conditions for the 
expectations with which we are concerned. On page 000 (Measham and 
Weisberg 2003) they say 
If there are an infinite number of possibilities over which to sum, 
the EU [expected utility] is the value to which the series 
absolutely converges; otherwise it is undefined. 
This statement is false. Absolute convergence
3
 is a stronger condition than 
convergence, and all that is needed for the EU of an infinite number of 
possibilities to be defined is for it to converge. These conditions can come 
 
3
 Un converges absolutely means that |Un| converges. 
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apart for alternating series (ones in which the signs of the terms alternate), 
many of which converge but do not converge absolutely.  
In footnote 2 they say 
If a sum Un absolutely converges to s, then any sum Vn, 
obtained by rearranging terms of Un, will also converge to s. 
This too is false. It could be made true if ‘also converge to s’ is changed to 
‘also converge absolutely to s’, but we think it is probably a misstatement of 
the rearrangement theorem: 
If a sum Un absolutely converges, and Un converges to s, then 
any sum Vn, obtained by rearranging terms of Un, will also 
converge to s. 
The point is that what a series converges to, and converges absolutely to, need 
not be the same. For example, when E(B – A) is absolutely convergent,  
E(B – A) = 0, but the value to which E(B – A) absolutely converges, |dn|, is 
strictly positive (since at least one term is positive).
 4
 
These misunderstandings vitiate what they say about E(B – A) and, we 
think, lead them to misunderstand the role of our lemma on p. 433—which 
states that E(A) is finite iff E(B – A) is absolutely convergent—in analysing 
the kinds of paradoxical case there are. They say: 
Thus the EU of swapping would be the expectation of B – A,  
E(B – A), except that this sum does not converge absolutely; 
given appropriate rearrangements, the sum can be made to 
converge to any value. So decision theory does not rank 
 
4
 The sequence dn is defined on p. 431. 
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swapping against sticking. Clark and Shackel give this result 
surprisingly little consideration. (Measham and Weisberg 2003, 
p. 000) 
There are two claims here, the second dependent on the first. The first is 
that decision theory can evaluate swapping only by use of E(B – A), and the 
second that if E(B – A) doesn’t converge absolutely then decision theory 
makes no recommendation. Even if we granted the first claim, the short 
answer is that this result is no result. It is quite possible for E(B – A) not to 
converge absolutely, yet to converge to 0, when decision theory will say be 
indifferent to swapping. We mention this possibility in remark (i) on p. 434, 
and give there an example in which E(A) is not finite, so E(B – A) does not 
converge absolutely (by the lemma), but converges to 0 (because the sequence 
2npn, is null). In such cases every suggested way of calculating 
choiceworthiness
5
 but E(A) – E(B) is identically zero, so no paradox arises.  
From now on, we will assume they said what they ought to have said about 
convergence. Then their second claim, combined with the above quotation 
similarly corrected, becomes the claim that if E(B – A) doesn’t converge then 
it is undefined and so decision theory makes no recommendation. Now their 
criticism of us for giving ‘this result surprisingly little consideration’ seems 
merely odd, since if that really were the full solution to the paradox it’s a 
solution we have given and upon which they are relying. For we say, as they 
quote us saying, that expectations for which the corresponding series has no 
defined sum are themselves undefined and need not be considered. Their 
 
5
 See pp. 431–32. 
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criticism can only amount to pointing out that having solved it thus, we have 
then deluded ourselves that there was some further problem to be solved. 
But of course, the reason we give it little consideration is because we reject 
their first claim, that decision theory can evaluate swapping only by use of  
E(B – A). This takes us on to their next criticism. The further problem  with 
which we have deluded ourselves would be that  
three other expectations whose infinite sums do converge 
absolutely [for the reasons given, strike ‘absolutely’]: E(E(B|A) – 
A), E(B – E(A|B)) and E(E(B – A|A + B)) … are not expressions 
for the EU of swapping given the standard definition of EU. 
Instead of each term in the series corresponding to a possible 
outcome, these series have as terms the sum of the utility and 
probability of two possible outcomes. By employing these 
average expectations, Clark and Shackel go beyond standard 
decision theory, and become responsible for the formulation and 
justification of a new theory in which average expectations play 
a role. (Measham and Weisberg 2003, p. 000) 
We can make little sense of this claim. Perhaps the first thing we should say is 
that if we have deluded ourselves by thinking this was some further problem, 
it is a delusion we seem to share with most other authors in the literature. 
Since expectations such as E(E(B|A) – A) are what those authors have been 
thinking about, we could hardly just ignore these contenders without ignoring 
previous discussions of the paradox. 
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We don’t understand what criteria they are applying to restrict definitions 
of expected utilities in order to exclude our three contenders for evaluating 
swapping. 
in the central heartland of decision theory … the simple 
Bayesian rule holds good: desirability measures 
choiceworthiness. (Jeffrey 1990, p. 20) 
What Jeffrey means by desirability is what is sometimes referred to as utility 
and sometimes as value. In our paper we used ‘value’, our critics use ‘utility’. 
But whichever term is used, standard decision theory simply imports 
probability theory wholesale, and defines the value of an act to be the 
expectation, conditional on that act, of a random variable which represents the 
value of outcomes numerically. Expectations are defined within probability 
theory. We relied on a number of standard theorems and definitions of 
probability theory, among which are: 
If X and Y are random variables, n and m real numbers, then  
 (a) nX + mY + k  is a random variable 
 (b) E(nX + mY + k) is an expectation 
(c) E(X|Y) is a random variable (Feller 1968, p. 223) 
 (d) E(E(X|Y)) is an expectation. 
When, as in the raw paradox, you suppose x to be in your envelope and 
calculate 5/4 x as the expectation for the other, what you are actually 
calculating is a random variable, E(B|A) – A, and so you must calculate the 
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expectation of that random variable E(E(B|A) – A) to get properly started. 6 As 
is evident from our paper (and many earlier ones), that point on its own solves 
all the finite cases.  
Our three contenders are therefore proper expectations. It isn’t true that  
E(B – A) is the only way decision theory offers to evaluate swapping, and, 
exciting as it would be to be able to claim otherwise, nothing we have done 
goes beyond standard decision theory.  
Symmetry 
What Measham and Weisberg are proposing to solve the paradoxes amounts 
to rejecting contenders for evaluating swapping if they are based on 
conditionalization. We need to see some principled reasons for doing so, not 
just a rejection because they get the wrong result (for if that was all that was 
needed, we could all have saved ourselves a great deal of time!). We think it 
unlikely that there are principled reasons to ignore these contenders, since it is 
an absolutely standard technique to compute expectations by conditioning (see 
 
6
 One terminological point can now be explained: although we used the phrase 
‘average expected gain on swapping’ to distinguish references to, for example, 
E(E(B|A) – A), from references to, for example, E(B|A) – A, it would have been quite 
proper to have called them expected gains on swapping, since that is what they are. 
We did this because random variables such as E(B|A) – A have been referred to as 
expectations in the earlier literature due to a notational ambiguity. For example, if c is 
a constant, then while E(B|A) – A is a random variable, E(B|A=c) – c is an expectation 
which is sometimes misleadingly written as E(B|A=c) – A and even just as  
E(B|A) – A. Perhaps this practice should be deprecated, but since mathematicians 
seem to negotiate the ambiguity without problem, it is unlikely to change. 
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for example Ross 1988, pp. 285 ff.). Most of the time it doesn’t matter which 
way you condition (see p. 436), but sometimes it does, and the broader 
question which the two-envelope paradox raises, in particular the new variety 
we discovered and named ‘best paradoxes’, is how you get it right when it 
matters which way you condition.  
We think dismissing the best paradoxes because in these cases E(B – A) is 
undefined
7
 is a way of ignoring the problem rather than dealing with it. One 
could take the same approach to Newcomb’s problem on the grounds that 
cases in which the evidential structure and causal structure get out of kilter 
with each other are cases in which decision theory should simply be given up. 
But some have thought that the right approach is to modify standard decision 
theory so that in taking into account the evidence it does so in a manner which 
is constrained by the causal structure. We think something similar applies 
here. 
Compare the standard case with the variant we describe on p. 426:  
Determine A according to the probability distribution … :  
p0 = 
1
/12, pn = ½pn–1 + ½ (¼)
n
 for n   1.8 Let the probability of A 
= 1 be p0 and the probability of A = 2
n
, n  1, be pn–1 + pn. Then 
 
 
7
 Strongly in these cases, since the failure of convergence is not divergence to infinity 
but divergence by oscillation. 
 
8
 The distribution was introduced and correctly described on p. 423, but erroneously 
re-described on p. 426, and we take the opportunity to correct it here: we had 
pn+1 = ½pn … in place of pn = ½pn–1… 
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determine B thus: if A = 1, B = 2, else B = half or double A, with 
the probability ratios pn–1 : pn. If A comes out as 4, for example, 
the expectation for B is (2p1 + 8p2)/(p1 + p2) = 4
4
/9. You are 
handed the first sealed envelope containing the sum A and given 
the option of swapping it for the second, whose content is B. It 
will always be rational to swap and the average expected gain 
will be 
7
/12, though the expectations for each envelope have no 
finite mean. 
In both the standard case and the two-stage variant described above, E(B – A) 
is undefined, so according to Measham and Weisberg decision theory has no 
recommendation to make. E(E(B–A|A+B)) gets the right answer for the 
standard case (be indifferent to swapping), as we showed, and E(E(B|A) – A) 
gets the right answer for the two-stage variant (swap). Is this just a 
coincidence? Clearly not. They don’t get these answers right accidentally, but 
because the terms of their series reflect something of the causal structure of 
the problem, in this case how it came about.  
If the problem is to be addressed as opposed to abandoned, we need to 
constrain standard decision theory by the relevant causal structure of the 
situation. Our solution is to put forward the symmetry of the situation as the 
significant constraint which relevantly reflects both the evidential structure 
and the causal structure. (For details, see p. 427.) Our critics are sceptical of 
this constraint because 
the argument in favour of the [symmetry] constraint would not 
convince anyone who did not already agree with their 
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conclusions, such as someone who thought that E(E(B|A) – A) or 
E(B  – E(A|B)) was correct  
and 
The intuition behind their symmetry constraint … leads directly 
to the conclusion that swapping and sticking are equipreferable. 
So … [to] go on to apply this intuition to the calculation of 
average expectations … adds an unmotivated mathematical 
epicycle with no explanatory gain. (Measham and Weisberg 
2003, p. 000) 
Our problem with the first criticism is that (so far as we know) there is no 
one who thinks that in the standard case either E(E(B|A) – A) or E(B  – E(A|B)) 
gets it right. If they did, what would be their reason for preferring one to the 
other? After all, unless one thinks the labelling reflects something special 
about my envelope being mine, the labelling of the envelopes by ‘A’ and ‘B’ is 
completely arbitrary. But there is nothing special about my envelope being 
mine, so by symmetry neither of these two alternative can be preferred over 
the other. If they don’t prefer one to the other, they are committed to the 
irrationality of thinking it is rational both to swap and not to swap.  
Our answer to the second criticism is that the explanatory gain is available 
only to those who are interested in the problem taken in the way that we have 
just outlined it, namely, what to do when conditionalizing as a method for 
evaluating expected utility gives different results depending on how you 
conditionalize. The challenge is to explain why E(E(B–A|A+B)) gets the right 
answer for the standard case and E(E(B|A) – A) gets the right answer for the 
two-stage variant.  
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If there were nothing to say in answer to that question then we would agree 
that showing them to get the right answer achieves nothing on its own. But it 
turns out there is something to say. Exhibiting the fact that the terms of their 
series reflect something about the causal structure of the situation suggests a 
more general truth: that evaluating expected utility by conditionalizing may 
sometimes require conditionalizing in a way that corresponds to the causal 
structure on pain (sometimes) of getting the answer wrong.  
Calculating expectations by conditionalizing is a vital technique. Many 
evidential situations do not allow one to compute expectations except via 
conditionalization. Since economists use such conditionalization, and if they 
were to do so in a situation allowing of best paradoxical cases, there may be 
no warning signals that the application of the mathematics is being done in 
dangerous waters, such as would be given by getting expectations which 
diverged.  
 
Looking inside your envelope 
We need to distinguish two different cases. The first is the case in which you 
look in your envelope and calculate a positive expected gain on swapping. The 
second is the case in which it is argued that since if you looked in your 
envelope you would calculate a positive expected gain on swapping, you 
ought to swap anyway (with or without opening the envelope).
9
 We think both 
of these cases are answered by our remarks in section 4 of our paper. 
In the first case the argument seems to be about whether it would in general 
be a good policy to open your envelope before deciding what to do. Now if 
 
9
  Cf. p.  428, footnote 11. 
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you open your envelope and discover it contains the minimum amount, £1, 
then you know you should swap, because the other envelope must contain £2. 
So then the question arises, if you do open your envelope, what should you do 
in all the other cases, when you find more than £1 in your envelope? We 
argued that, despite the extra information you have on opening your envelope, 
whether swapping is better on average is in general unaffected by the 
knowledge you gain. (See the argument about repeated trials on pp. 429–30.)  
But Measham and Weisberg contend that 
this ‘on average heuristic’, where the value of A is not fixed, is 
irrelevant to the peeking case since the value of A is known. 
Furthermore it is misleading to speak of the EU of repeated 
trials, since in the peeking case the question is whether or not 
one should switch in a particular case, given that one has seen a 
particular amount in envelope A. Indeed, with some probability 
distributions it will be the case that the EU of switching is 
positive for some values of A and negative for others. (Measham 
and Weisberg 2003, p. 000) 
If there are probability distributions of this type, then, if one of them applies in 
a two-envelope case in which you look in your envelope (which can be 
doubted—see footnote 11), it will of course be true that you will know that 
swapping will be advantageous in some cases but not others, even if the 
average expected gain, properly calculated, is 0. (Provided, of course, that you 
know what the probability distribution is.) Not only would finding £1 mean 
you knew you should swap, but perhaps all odd powers of £2 should be 
swapped and all even powers kept. The knowledge acquired from looking will 
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make all the difference, and the ‘average heuristic’ will, as they say, be 
irrelevant. There would be no extra puzzle about looking in such cases.  
However, distributions like that described above and others discussed in the 
literature are not of that type. They are such that if there is an expected gain on 
swapping in any case where A > 1, there is an expected gain in every other. In 
that case the average expected gain must be positive. But if, setting A = 1 
aside, it is 0, then the expected gain for each case apart from 1 must also be 0.  
In these cases, then, the ‘average heuristic’ is not irrelevant. Stressing as 
they do the particular case cannot get us away from the fact that we are 
considering policies. There are two possible policies: open then swap or be 
indifferent (unless you find just £1). What does the advice ‘open then swap’ 
amount to if not ‘on average you will do better if you swap’? But that just 
insinuates calculating the expected gain on swapping the wrong way again, 
insinuates calculating E(E(B|A) – A) because when you open the envelope you 
calculate E(B|A=c) – c.10   
We don’t deny that it continues to seem plausible to swap because  
E(B|A=c) – c is positive for each c, anymore than we deny that in Newcomb’s 
problem one-boxing continues to seem plausible. But it is a misleading 
plausibility for the reasons we gave in the last section. When the causal 
structure and evidential structure get out of kilter, there are all sorts of 
tempting ways, as Lewis so aptly put it, of  ‘mak[ing] the news … the news 
you like best’ (Lewis 1981, p. 309). Our suggestion is that the thought to 
which Measham and Weisberg are appealing is one of those tempting ways. 
And that, in essence, is our answer to the second case as well. In both cases a 
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 See footnote 5 again. 
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thought is offered which once more persuades you to manage the news rather 
than managing the world, by calculating E(E(B|A) – A) instead of E(E(B–
A|A+B)). When instead you constrain your news management by the causal 
structure, you know that opening the envelope makes no difference to the 
contents of the envelopes, so cannot make any difference to the correct 
application of decision theoretic calculations.
11
  
So we think there is a significant analogy to be made with Newcomb’s 
problem, although the details of the analogy are not exact. The two-envelope 
paradox is another case in which evidential structure and causal structure 
come apart, and resolving the problems encountered by rational decision 
theory when it appears to follow the evidential structure correctly requires us 
to bring the causal structure to bear on how rational decision theory is applied.  
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 With this thought in mind, it becomes particularly difficult to see how a probability 
distribution giving rise to ‘the EU of switching [being] positive for some values of A 
and negative for others’ (Measham and Weisberg 2003, p. 000) could ever apply to 
the two-envelope paradox. As we presented it ‘you are presented with two sealed 
envelopes, one of which contains twice as much money as the other, and you select 
one at random’ (p. 435). Here, the evidence and the causal history would seem to be 
aligned in ruling out such a distribution. 
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